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Much is heard of "Political farm leaders' and of those who
'fann the farmer.' Anybody who attempts to do anything at all
for agriculture may fairly be expected to meet opposition in
such terms. But little is known of tliose men whose sense of
justice rawly offended by tlie undoubted inequality visited
upon the farmer, have devoted tbeir time to his cause with
an almost fanatical devotion.'
Thus was the 51-year-old Edwin T.
Meredith eulogized when he died in
1928. He was acclaimed as a poor fann
hoy who in tum became a successful
publisher, farm leader, businessman
and politician.
Meredith's eareer as a publisher
began at 19 when he was presented by
hi.s grandfather with the Farmer's
Tribune as a wedding gift. The news-
paper had been founded and pub-
lished by his grandfather in Des
Moines as a political organ devoted to E. T. Meredith
the support of the Populist party. On taking over the paper,
Meredith discontinued its advocacy of partisan polities, and
although it became reasonably profitable, be sold it in 1902.
He then established a new publieation. Successful Farming,
devoted to practical suggestions for the midwestem farmer.
' Chicago Journal of Commerce, quoted in Edwin T. Meredith,
1871-1928: A Memorial Volume, 42. Des Moines: Meredith Publishing
Co., 1931.
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courtesy of Meredith Publishing Co.
After a few years in a precarious financial condition. Sue-
cessful Farming became a prosperous concern which for
years, had a larger circulation than any other farm magazine
ever published in Iowa. In 1922 Meredith established Fruit,
Garden and Home which two years later became the current
Better Homes and Gardens.
The recognition of Meredith as a successful businesman is
reflected in his election to the board of directors of the
U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the presidencies of the
Agricultural Publishers Association and Associated Advertising
Clubs of the World. He often addressed these and other
business organizations on tlie enormous buying potential of
the famier and on the role played by agriculture in the
économie welfare of the country.
As a politician, Meredith was less successful. He ran for
the U. S. Senate in 1914 and for governor of Iowa in 1916,
but was defeated in both instances. Altliough tempted to try
again for political office, the "mudslinging" attending his
campaign for the governorship discouraged him from further
efforts in this direction. Meredith insisted, however, that the
forces for good government should not be discouraged, and
he remained sufficiently influential, politically, to be appointed
secretary of agriculture by President Woodrow Wilson in
1920.
Meredith accomplished Httle during his brief tenure in
Wilson's cabinet. Nevertheless, his occupancy of this agri-
culturally significant post gave him the opportunity to clarify
the goals and potentialities of the Department of Agriculture.
Writing to Josephus Daniels, secretary of the navy, Meredith
said he wanted "to see that the people of the country were
given a better idea of what the Department meant to the
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business and laboring interests through its work in behalf
of agriculture as well as through its pure food work, meat in-
spection and other matters that had to do with tbe public
generally.^ Meredith's interest in agriculture was stimulated
by his background, his efforts as a publisher of farm maga-
zines and his devotion to tbe agrarian economy of his native
state of Iowa.
Meredith considered agriculture the base upon which the
American economy was founded. He also had a high regard
for the fanner who, Meredith wrote, "is no different from
the rest of us, except that he is just a little more thoughtful,
reads a little more on the average than the rest of us, thinks
a little clearer on most things than most of us, and is hardly
as selfish as most of us . . ."^  Meredith felt that although the
farmer was more individualistie and demoeratic tban his city
neighbors, he would nevertheless leave the farm if the city
offered him greater material benefits. The only way in which
this natural materialistic tendency could be counteracted was
to offer the fanner benefits comparable to those enjoyed by
the city dweller.
In the 1920s Meredith had emphasized the importance of
die farmer in the general economy through his investment in
tools, machinery, household goods, clothing and other manu-
factured items. Businessmen, he stressed, should not be
oblivious of the capital goods market for which the farmer
was responsible. By the 1930s Meredith's idea had taken hold,
and it had become popular to consider the farmer as a
consumer rather than as an example of moral excellence.
Meredith did not share the anti-labor bias of the business-
man and farmer. He sought to win organized labor's support
when he ran for office and maintained an amicable relation-
ship with his own employes, hiring only union labor when-
ever available. His benevolent attitude towards his employes
was reciprocated, as reflected by the long periods they re-
mained with him. As early as 1919 Meredith advocated the
^ Meredith tx) Josephus Daniels, March 18, 1924, item 8417, folder 38,
ho.^  11, Meredith Papers, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa. (Here-
inafter cited as MeretUth Papers. )
^ "An Address on the Farm Market," delivered to Agricultural Con-
ference and Exhibit, item 2672, box 59, Meredith Papers.
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right of labor to organize and bargain collectively as "just
and fair." He supported tlie American Federation of Labor
as a means for the worker to "have the benefit of wise leader-
ship, sane counsel, and the interchange of views between the
several sections of the country." Few businessmen could
accept such a liberal view.
Unlike most farm leaders, he did not attribute the decline
in prices of basic farm commodities of the 1920s on the high
cost of labor. On the contrary, he argued that when agri-
culture was depressed, business and labor suffered and, con-
versely, both profited when agriculture prospered. Subsequent
events, however, contradicted Meredith's views: while most
businesses prospered and labor's real income rose during the
1920s, the price of farm commodities declined from 221 in
1919 to 211 in 1920 and culminated in a disastrous slump to
124 in 1921. The fanner's income remained low throughout
the decade, despite the sundry cures advocated to remedy
the condition.
The plight of the farmer was called to the attention of
Congress in 1924 with the presentation of the first McNary-
Haugen bill. As originally devised, the bill set up a govemment
export corporation which was to buy specified agricultural
commodities on a sufficient scale to raise tiieir domestic prices;
it was tlien to sell these abroad at the prevailing prices on
the world market. Subsequent bills added support for co-
operatives and minimized the use of tariffs to keep foreign
foodstuffs from entering the country. Various modifications
were made in order to render the bills acceptable to the
Sotitliem cotton growers and to meet the objections voiced
by President Coolidge who vetoed the 1927 and 1928 versions
of the bill.
In all, five McNary-Haugen bills were considered between
1924 and 1928. Each was based on the same principles: (1)
that the Federal Government dispose of surplus fann products
abroad, thereby raising prices to the desired level on the
domestic market; and (2) that the loss incurred by such ex-
ports be reimbursed to the govemment by the fanners through
an equalization fee.
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The MeNary-Haugen bills beeame a symbol for an agrarian
revival and added an air of militaney to the farmer's struggle
to escape domination by industrial interest. Even those who
were skeptical of the economic value of the bills, championed
them actively. Thus Rexford Guy Tugwell. an eeonomist wbo
opposed the bill during its earher years, could by 1928 say,
"The more I study the bill of 1928, the deeper my admiration
becomes." Although some of the fanners' organizations sup-
ported the McNary-Haugen doctrine only half-heartedly, most
of them l^ ecame enthusiastic in its praise. Members of Con-
gress who voted in favor of the bills did so in some cases with
the feeling that it was far from perfect and only a "palliative."
William Raymond Green of Iowa voted for the biU in the
House because he wished "to have something done for the
benefit of the farmer," and desired that the biU go to the
Senate where he was assured that it would be amended. As
the McNary-Haugen bills gained support, however, doubts
as to its benefits to the fanner increased.
Meredith had several objections to the McNary-Haugen
measures, although he supported the bills in Gongress. His
principal argument against the bills was that they were not
economically feasible since tbe fanner would plant such
crops as had fetched the highest price, thus promoting constant
surpluses. Thus, if the price of com was raised out of pro-
portion to other crops, its production would be greatly in-
creased. The McNary-Haugen bills, in Meredith's opinion,
could not improve the farmer's condition but were comparable
to gambling at roulette. The farmer, Meredith said, "does not
know where to put his money and, like most human beings,
naturally puts it into the crop that has paid tiie best the year
before, which, by the way, is about the worst thing he can
do, resulting in larger production and a consequent decline in
price."'' However, Meredith did see some value in the idea
behind the McNary-Haugen plan, and he answered its critics
in a unique manner worthy of being repeated here.
* Meredith to B. C, Way, Nov. 17, 1925, item 162, folder 2, box 1,
Meredith Papers.
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One aeeusation directed at the MeNary-Haugen plan was
that it fi.\ed prices. Raising prices artificially by government
intervention was considered by many as immoral and un-
constitutional. As one banker expressed it, the price system
"is too compIieEited a system to be arranged arbitrarily; it
must work freely and automatically in order to make the
adjustments that are constantly necessary to maintain the
equilibrium.'^' Meredith developed a plan whieh he said did
not constitute price fixing but was, rather, a practical appli-
cation of the law of supply and demand.
A second criticism of the McNary-Haugen bill was that
it constituted class legislation. The opponents of tlie bill argued
that the bill would aid only the farmer; moreover, it would aid
only eertain types of agriculture. The supporters of the bill
countered with the argument that the govemment aided labor
and business, so why not also the farmer? Tlie farmer was
entirely justified in requesting laws to secure stability and to
protect the farmer from violent fluctuations in priée. Meredith
usually argued that what was good for agriculture would aid
the country as a whole. He proved with innumerable statistics
that industry was dependent upon the fanner's buying
capacity; therefore, business and labor in their own interest
should raise farm prices so the fanner could buy more fin-
ished goods.
The third objection raised against the MeNary-Haugen bill
was that efficient farm management would solve the farmer's
problem. Puritan ethics, which dominated American culture
at the time, insisted that people who were virtuous prospered;
those who failed, on the other hand, were devoid of such
traits as industry, integrity and thrift. President Coolidge in
his veto message of 1927 reflected this feeling when he said
that farmers were not being efficient when they only grew
one crop. The President thought it would be immoral for the
•' The argument that the MeNary-Haugen biU was unc-onstitntional
was accepted by President Coolidge who added a memorandum by the
Attorney General to that effect in his veto message. See Congressional
Record, LXVUI, 69th Congress, Second Session, 1927, 4776-78
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indolent farmer to "be given special favors at the expense of
the farmer who has toiled for years to build up a constmetive
farming enterprise to include a variety of crops and livestock
that shall, so far as possible, be safe, and keep the soil, the
fanner's chief asset, fertile and productive."" Neither the Presi-
dent nor Meredith noted that modem farm equipment was
too expensive to allow the farmer to practice both efficiency
and diversification of his crops. Instead, Mereditli countered
by saying that the fanner was more efficient than any other
group since he had to do many tasks well: acting as buyer,
seller, banker, mechanic, architect, etc.
Meredith was concemed, however, by the fact that no
matter how efficient a fanner might be, he could not buy
with his earnings what a laborer with less time spent at his
work could purchase. The farmer was encouraged to over-
produce and to use old-fa.shioned methods. "If I gave you an
order for a million catalogs to be dehvered in six months and
said I would detennine the price when you delivered them,
it is not lßiely you would spend much money in printing tbe
catalogs," Meredith said.'' The McNary-Haugen bills, by not
limiting production, would not improve the lot of the farmer.
Meredith thought "that agrieulture can never be put on a
business basis until the farmer has an opportunity, as every
other individual has. of either accepting or declining an offer
for his services, basing his decision upon his judgment as to
whether he can or cannot successfully perform the services
required on the basis of the compensation he will receive."*
To solve the farmer's problems rationally, Meredith argued,
production should be adjusted to the needs of the United
States. The price of basic farm goods should be set before the
farmer plants his crops and not after they are in the ground,
as the McNary-Haugen act demanded.^
^ Quoted in Congressional Record, LXVIII, 69th Congress, Second
Session, 1927,4771.
•' Meredith to John Watson, Sept. 19, 1923, item 3226. folder 19,
box 5, Meredith Papers.
" Meredith to Ralph Smith, May 24, 1926, item 19429, folder 115,
box 32, Meredith Papers.
^ Meredith, "McNary-Haugen Bill," 5; Meredith to F. R. Harrison,
Nov. 26, 1923, item 10901, folder 53, box 16, Meredith Papers.
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The original conception of Meredith's plan {which never
received a name) may be found in a 1917 Suecessful Fanning
editorial. Contracting to produce at a predetermined price,
the editorial pointed out, "reduces the hazards of business."
Sugar beets, milk, vegetables and fruits were being grown
for prices set in advance. The same system could be extended
to other crops, as well as to stock raising, which was "looked
upon by many as too much of a gamble . . ." to warrant
production. "The proposed government minimum price for
staple fann produets would amount to practically a contract
price. With a few crops stabilized, the price of many farm
products would become steady. For example, corn always
follows wheat prices, and pork seems to follow com prices."'"
The mechanism for carrying out the plan was relatively
simple, according to Meredith. A commission would be set
up composed of the secretaries of Labor. Commerce and Agri-
culture. On the basis of the readily available statistics, com-
piled by the Department of Agriculture, the commission would
set a fair price for basic commodities. Should a surplus of any
commodity develop, the price for it would be lowered the
following year in order to discourage its production. When a
shortage of any crop developed, the price set for it would
be increased. Meredith anticipated that within three years,
fair prices would be established in accord with the level of
domestic consumption. The effects of weather, insects and
other natural disturbances would, he felt, be minimal. In
ease a surplus developed, it would be stored or sold on the
world's open market and the loss absorbed by the govern-
ment. The expenses of the commission were to be paid for
by general tax funds, since agricultural depressions affected
all the people. Should business and labor protest this arrange-
ment, Meredith was content to have the farmers provide the
fund as a form of mutual insurance. This last suggestion
would avoid making the farmer feel that he was "making a
raid on the Treasury or being classed as asking for charity."
'" "Price Fixing," Successful Farming, XVI, 7. Des Moines: Meredith
Publishing Co., June 1917.
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The farmer, Meredith thought, would be less averse to
paying a small tax annually "knowing it was coming each
year," than paying the McNary-Haugen equalization fee
which taxed only in the event of low prices for fann goods.
Another method of applying the tax, suggested Meredith, was
to remit one-half of one per cent of the set price as a fixed
tax.
On price-fixing Meredith said tliat his plan contained:
. . . no thought tliat the farmers should be guaranteed a profit
or that tbere should be guaranteed prices whicb would assure
tbem a profit. My wbole tbought is tliat prices sbould be
stabilized and indicated in advance to such an extent that the
farmers may have a choise [sic] of devoting his efforts to
wheat, com, cotton, wool or otber lines . . . TWs really means
that be sbould go into tbe line for wbicb there is a demand
rather tban over-supply and in tbe final analysis, tbis means
interpreting tbt; law of supply and demand to bim in a way
that he [the farmer] can understand it.^ ^
The plan was intended to encourage good management,
conservation of the soil, the newer techniques of farming and
diversification. Meredith made no attempt to implement these
suggestions while serving as Secretary of Agriculture in 1920.
Instead, he recommended that the Federal Covemment should
stimulate cooperative marketing and collect and disseminate
data on supply, price and marketing information.
Meredith's plan was published in order to stimulate dis-
cussion, but as Mereditli stated "the more I think of it and
the more arguments are presented against it . . . the more
I am convinced that such a plan could bo put into operation
with very great benefit.""* Optimistically, he wrgte, that his
plan was becoming acceptable to "more and more . . . as
they debate it in their own minds."
Meredith felt that his plan was free of the criticism directed
at tlie McNary-Haugen proposals. That this was not the case
is obvious, since both plans used the Federal Covernment to
maintain farm prices and tlierefore were opposed by those
who wanted to keep the govemment out of agrieulture.
^^  Meredith to W. I. Drummond, Jan. 5, 1922, item 318Ü, folder 19,
box 5, Meredith Papers.
'" Mereditb to J. W. Beatson, Nov. 5, 1923, item 11428, folder 56,
box 17, Nfereditb Papers. ' '
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Businessmen and bankers responded to Mereditli's proposal
witli eriticisms they had directed at tlie McNary-Haugen l)i]ls.
Meredith tried to convince them of the wisdom of raising farm
prices by setting a fair price before the farmer planted his
crop. As he wrote the president of the U. S. Ghamber of
Gommerce, "I feel there is nobody more capable . . . and
upon whom the responsibility rests most heavily than the
Ghamber of Gommerce of the United States, to work out
this definite [agricultural] policy." He felt that the bigger
businessman would work out a solution similar to his.'" The
national Ghamber of Gommerce throughout the 1920s ap-
proved neither the McNary-Haugen nor Meredith's plans.
Meredith never tried to win the backing of farm groups for
his plan and lacking a good organization his plan was never
actually discussed as a feasible alternative to the McNary-
Haugen bills. In spite of his interest in polities, Meredith did
not try to get his plan accepted tlirough the political process.
The farmers were convinced that McNary-Haugenism would
solve their problems; the other major interest groups were
not interested in any proposal regardless of its merits.
The passage of time has enhanced the basic soundness
of Meredith's views. His insight into the economics of agri-
culture in a modem industrial society reflects his ability and
experience as a businessman and farmer, as well as his
genuine interest in the welfare of the agrictilturalist. His
honesty and sense of social justice motivated him to place
tïie interest of the farmer over political expediencey and
personal gain. He deserves to be counted as a great man for
his work in behalf of his fellow Iowans.
The City of Des Moines recognized the efforts and con-
tributions of Edwin T. Meredith in 1962 tchen it constructed
Meredith junior high sehool. Dedication ceremonies were
held Sept. 2, 1962. "Meredith" stands, along with Hoover
senior high school, on a 50-acre lot donated by the Meredith
family.—Ed.
^^  Meredith to jobn W. O'Lear>, July 13, 1926, item 12728, folder
65, box 20, Meredith Papers,

